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COMMENTS
losses he may actually sustain, but also to provide a fund directly
available to one injured as a result of acts of the named insured
or of additional insureds under the expanded coverage currently
afforded by liability policies. The approach taken by Louisiana
towards a solution of the problems engendered by today's wide-
spread use of automobiles, with all their potential for causing
damage, is a realistic evaluation of the role played by automobile
liability insurance. The courts have liberally construed the
provisions of the statute so as best to serve the purposes it was
designed to fulfill.
John Schwab II
Free Enterprise- Cost of Capital Rate
Determination: "Rolled In" Costs
A public utility rate proceeding is of interest to the general
public only in that the final result of it may be an increase or
decrease in the prices paid by the public for the service they
receive from that particular utility. The price paid by the con-
sumer for service, however, is fixed only after consideration
of many factors which bear both on the interest of the public
in lower rates, and the interest of the utility in maintaining a
financially sound enterprise. It would seem that a fair rate
determination should arrive at the best balance between the
interests of the consumer and the interests of the utility and its
investors. In order for a utility to be financially sound, it must
receive revenues in excess of its operating expenses that will
enable it to retire its fixed indebtedness and to pay a fair return
to its investors.1 This excess is usually expressed as a percentage
of the total capital investment of the utility, known as the com-
posite rate of return.
1. This is basically a statement of the rule announced in the case of Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944), wherein the Court
stated: "[T]he fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interests. . . . From the investor or company point
of view, it is important that there be enough revenues not only for operating
expenses, but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on
the debt and dividends on the stock.... By that standard the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit
and to attract capital."
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The recent case of United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Commission2 presents an excellent vehicle for a dis-
cussion of the treatment of utility rate proceedings by the Lou-
isiana Public Service Commission and the Louisiana Supreme
Court. In that case, United sought an increase in the price which
it was allowed to charge for gas marketed in the New Orleans
zone.3 The Commission used the prudent-investment-cost-of-cap-
ital method for determining the composite rate of return, and
concluded that a 5.5 percent rate of return would be reasonable
and just under the circumstances.4 In determining operating
expenses, the Commission used the "rolled in" method, com-
puting the cost of gas to United by averaging the cost of gas
purchased in Louisiana with the cost of gas purchased in other
states. The district court disapproved the "rolled in" method of
determining costs of gas, and also held that the rate of return
of 5.5 percent was not reasonable and just.5 On appeal, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Commission had no juris-
diction to consider the interstate costs of gas in its intrastate
rate determinations, and further, that this method would present
an unrealistic picture of operating costs if it were used. As to
the matter of rate of return, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed the district court and held that a composite rate of return
of 5.5 percent which allows a return of 8.186 percent on equity
2. 130 So.2d 652 (La. 1961).
3. It is notable here that the commission and the court set the differential
between the price of domestic and industrial gas at 2.75¢/Mcf instead of the
traditional 5¢/Mcf. Chief Justice Fournet, in dissent, felt that the Commission
lacked the necessary evidence to support the fixing of the lesser differential. In-
dustrial consumers have traditionally received a lower rate on natural gas than
have domestic consumers, largely because of the better load factors which decrease
the cost of service. The majority, however, felt that each class of consumers
should bear its fair share of the cost of service, and that domestic rates should
not subsidize industrial gas costs.
The court did not indicate that its decision to lower the differential was based
on any feeling that industrial uses of gas are less desirable than domestic uses.
Such a feeling has been expressed by the Federal Power Commission and the
United States Supreme Court, however, in their disapproval of the large scale
use of natural gas for industrial purposes, such as heating boilers, because of the
diminishing supply of natural gas and its great versatility in domestic uses. See
Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81 Sup.
Ct, 435 (1961) ; BLACTILY & OATMAN, NATURAL GAS AND TLE PUBLIC INTEREST
142 (1947). By increasing the proportionate costs of natural gas to industrial
consumers, the Louisiana Supreme Court may discourage in some degree the use
of gas for industrial purposes, and thus fall in line with the policy of the Federal
Power Commission.
4. 40 LA. PUB. SERv. CoMm. ANN. REP. 43, 58 (1961).
5. The district court raised the composite rate of return to 6%.
6. This figure represents the return on the "book value" of the stock of
United. The stockholders do not receive this percentage of market value as divi-
dends because the market value paid by the stockholders is normally higher than
the book value.
The court states that "through the exercise of judgment based on the evidence,
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capital was reasonable and just. Two Justices dissented on the
ground that the customary rate of return of 6 percent should
have been allowed.
7
Cost Determination: System Wide Average, or
"Rolled In" Method
Because the composite rate of return fixed by the Commis-
sion is based on its prior determination of operating expenses,
it is important that the Commission's determination accurately
reflect the utility's actual operating expenses. Since the cost of
natural gas constitutes a large percentage of the operating ex-
penses for a natural gas company," it is important that the
method of calculating the cost of gas to the company give an
accurate picture of the actual costs. If the operating expenses
as computed by the regulating body are less than actual ex-
penses, the rate of return is reduced. Conversely, if operating
expenses are set at a figure greater than actual expenses, it is
clear that the company can use as "return" some of the money
that the regulating body has calculated as expense.
The Federal Power Commission, which regulates utilities
on an interstate basis,9 seems to take the position that the "rolled
in" or system-wide average cost of gas should be used whenever
feasible.1 With an integrated utility servicing large portions
of the United States, this method makes the cost of service to
the individual consumer dependent on the average cost of service
to all consumers, rather than on the cost to the company for
service to him individually. This is helpful to customers serviced
by new facilities and new gas reserves, since the costs of the new
reserves, which are usually higher than costs of old reserves,
are distributed evenly among old and new customers. Conversely,
it places a burden on older customers since they are saddled with
the Commission adopted 8.18% as the proper cost of equity capital." United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 130 So.2d 652, 661 (La.
1961). It is not unlikely that the Commission first selected a composite rate of
return of 5.5% and, with that figure as a starting point, determined the cost of
equity capital.
7. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 130
So.2d 652, 665 (La. 1961).
8. Id. at 662.
9. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1938).
10. Battle Creek Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 281 F,2d 42, 35
P.U.R.3d 369, 374 (1960) ; Re Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 1012,
1021 (1958) ; Re United Gas Pipe Line Co., 14 F.P.C. 353, 391-400 (1955) ; Re
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 11 F.P.C. 324, 353, 354 (1952) ; Re Trunkline Gas
Supply Co., 8 F.P.C. 250, 258 (1949).
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increased rates with no corresponding improvements in ser-
vices."
State regulatory bodies are not authorized to consider inter-
state costs, property, or profits in intrastate rate determina-
tion. 12 This prevents overlapping between the jurisdiction of
the state and federal regulatory commissions and confines the
state commissions to regulation of matters actually under their
jurisdiction. Because of this limited jurisdiction, state regula-
tory commissions seldom have occasion to consider the problem
of whether costs should be calculated on a system-wide "rolled
in" basis, or on the basis of actual costs for the local service
being regulated.
This problem arose in the instant case largely because of the
dual structure of United's facilities. 3 The two major source
areas of natural gas for United were south Louisiana and south-
ern Texas. United had large lines running north from each of
these fields, but there was no substantial connection between
these lines as far south as New Orleans which would permit
gas produced in Texas to be used in the New Orleans zone.14
Consequently, all of the gas sold by United in the New Orleans
zone had been purchased in south Louisiana. Because of the
tremendous reserves in this area and the great demand for long-
term supplies of gas that could be met only by an area with
large reserves, prices of gas produced in the Louisiana fields
were substantially higher than those prevailing in the Texas
fields.' 5 The Commission proposed to average or "roll in" the
costs of all the gas purchased by United in Texas, Louisiana,
and other areas, and thus arrive at a lower total cost for the
11. Battle Creek Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 281 F.2d 42, 35
P.U.R.3d 369, 374 (1960); Re Trunkline Gas Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 1 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion at p. 27).
12. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133, 145-48 (1930) ; Simp-
son v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 435 (1913) ; Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Railroad Commission of South Carolina, 5 F.2d 77, 91 (E.D. S.C. 1925) ;
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama. 196 Fed. 800, 823 (N.D.
Ala. 1912) ; Morgan's L. & T.R. & S. S. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana,
127 La. 636, 53 So. 890 (1911).
13. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 130
So.2d 652, 662, n. 16 (La. 1961).
14. Ibid.
15. Because of the existence of large reserves, producers are able to make
long-term commitments. Strenuous competition among consumers to secure such
commitments had resulted in high prices. With the continued discovery of natural
gas reserves in Louisiana and increased demands in the North, there seems little
doubt that Louisiana will remain a popular market. See NEUNnx, THE NATURAL
GAS INDUSTRY 64, 79 (1960).
[Vol. XXII260
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gas sold in the New Orleans zone.' 6 Though this method would
have resulted in slightly lower prices for consumers of natural
gas in New Orleans, it would not have reflected the actual cost
of services to New Orleans consumers. Aside from the want
of jurisdiction to consider Texas prices, the court felt that such
an unrealistic calculation of costs of gas by the Commission
would not lead to an equitable result.
Rate of Return: Prudent Investment - Cost of Capital Method
The Constitution of Louisiana provides that rates fixed for
public utilities must be reasonable and just, but does not specify
a method for computing these rates.1'7  The Louisiana Public
Service Commission, in line with the Federal Power Commis-
sion and many other state commissions, has adopted the prudent-
investment-cost of capital method. Basically, this method con-
sists of determining how much income the utility must receive
in excess of its operating expenses in order to retire its fixed
indebtedness and pay dividends to its stockholders sufficient to
keep the stock attractive to investors in the market. The pro-
portion which this amount bears to the total amount of capital
invested in the utility gives a percentage which is called the
composite rate of return. In arriving at this composite rate of
return, it is necessary to consider individually the interest which
the company must pay on its debt capital and that which it must
pay on its equity capital.
The rate of interest a company must pay on debt capital is
fixed by contract, and is usually not difficult to determine. 18
Computing the dividends to be paid to stockholders is a more
difficult matter. The procedure used here is that of ascertain-
ing the appropriate rate from a study of earnings-price ratios, 9
which rate is usually adjusted somewhat on the basis of the in-
formed judgment of the Commission.
16. For testimony of the Commission's expert witness concerning the use of
the system-wide "rolled in" method at the hearing before the Commission, see the
New Orleans Times Picayune, July 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
17. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
18. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
130 So.2d 652, 660 (La. 1961).
19. As to the use of earnings-price ratios of "comparable" utilities, the court
said: "It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify other business undertakings
that are truly comparable. When made, the comparison results in little more
than a consideration of the effects of current economic conditions in investors'
attitudes. Finally, there is a dearth of objective data to make comparisons trust-
worthy." Id. at 661.
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A theoretical corporation will serve to illustrate how these
individual determinations of interest and dividends lead to the
formulation of a composite rate of return. Suppose the ABC
Corporation has a total capital investment of $100,000, $60,000
of which is debt capital and $40,000 equity capital. The rate of
interest that must be paid on debt capital is contractually fixed
at 4 percent. Thus it is seen that the cost of debt capital to ABC
is 4 percent x $60,000, or $2,400 annually. This figure is 2.4
percent of the total capital investment of $100,000. Similarly,
the rate of interest or dividends to be paid on equity capital has
been set by the Commission at 7.75 percent.20 Applying this
percentage to the $40,000 of equity, it is seen that the dividends
ABC must pay on its equity capital are $3,100 or 3.1 percent of
its total capital investment of $100,000. By adding the percent-
age of total capital that must be paid on debt capital to the
percentage of the total capital that must be paid on equity cap-
ital, a composite rate of return of 5.5 percent is obtained. On
the basis of these figures, the ABC Corporation should be able
to service its debt capital and pay a return to its equity holders
which will insure financial integrity and flow of capital if it
receives revenues over and above its operating expenses that
are equal to 5.5 percent of its total capital investment.2 1 These
computations are ordinarily expressed as follows:
Debt:
$60,000 x 4% (rate of interest) $2,400 = 2.4% of total capital
Equity:
$40,000 x 7.75%(,, " ) = $3,100 = 3.1% of total capital
$100,000 (total capital investment) 5.5% (composite
rate of return
on total capi-
tal invest-
ment)
This method of arriving at a fair rate of return has been
accepted by the Federal Power Commission and the Louisiana
20. This figure, as mentioned before, is based on earnings-price ratios and the
judgment of the Commission. A detailed discussion of all of the factors entering
into this determination is beyond the scope of this Note.
21. It should be noted that the Commission in the instant case applied the
composite rate of return to a property base instead of a base determined by the
total amount of capital invested. In theory, the final result should be the same,
and, for purposes of clarity, the discussion in this Note is handled solely in terms
of amount of capital invested in the enterprise.
[Vol. XXII
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Public Service Commission,22 but it has been slow to gain com-
plete acceptance in the courts of Louisiana. In one of the earliest
cases involving the Commission's use of the prudent investment
theory, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Commission's
refusal to grant a rate increase, stating that:
"[A]n examination of the Commission's records, beginning
with its adoption of the 'prudent investment' theory in the
Louisiana Public Service Commission case, will show that it
has invariably, for a period of six years and in 29 cases in
which it has fixed rates, allowed a return of 6% in matters
of this sort. Hence, if 6% is and has been considered by the
Commission to be a just and equitable rate of return, it
would seem that refusal to grant an applicant a rate increase
which would enable it to earn 6% would be inequitable and
unjust in the absence of exceptional circumstances. '23
In the 1957 case of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,24 the court upheld a
rate of return of less than 6%, apparently rejecting 6% as a
minimum reasonable rate. However, three years later, the court
indicated that a rate of return below 6% is discriminatory, and
seemed to return to that figure as a standard.25
The court in the instant case seems to have again retreated
from the position that a rate of return must be at least 6% to be
just and reasonable. It stated that there could be no standard
rate of return applicable to all utilities under all circumstances, 26
and accepted the Commission's judgment that a return of 5.5%
was fair. It should be noted that the two dissenters still held
to the view that a rate of return below 6% is discriminatory on
the basis of prior decisions of the court and comparisons with
the returns earned by other utilities. 27
It is submitted that the position adopted by the majority
of the court in the instant case takes better into account the
22. See WELCd, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 310
(1961).
23. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 222 La.
132, 139, 62 So.2d 250, 253 (1952).
24. 232 La. 446, 94 So.2d 431 (1957).
25. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 239 La. 175, 118 So.2d 372 (1960). For a discussion of the shift
in position made by the court from the 1957 to the 1960 Southern Bell cases, see
dissent of Hawthorne, J., in the latter case, id. at 394.
26. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 130
So.2d 652, 659 (La. 1961).
27. Fournet, C.J., and McCaleb, J. Id. at 665.
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realities of rate regulation problems. By refusing to adhere to
a set percentage as a standard rate of return for all utilities,
the court has enabled the Commission to consider the capital
structure of each individual utility in fixing its rate of return.
This is important, because a utility with a high proportion of
debt capital can pay interest on its debt, and pay a proper re-
turn to its equity holders while receiving a considerably smaller
composite rate of return than the utility with a low proportion
of debt capital. 28  It follows, then, that a utility with an "eco-
28. This can be illustrated by assuming a corporation which has a total capi-
tal investment of $100,000, a cost of debt capital contractually fixed at 4%, and
a composite rate of return on capital investment of 6%.
Assuming first that this corporation has a capital structure of 25% debt
capital and 75% equity capital, it is seen that the return on equity capital is
6.6%.
$ 25,000 Debt @ 4% = $1,000 = 1% of total capital investment
$ 75,000 Equity @ 6.6% = $5,000 = 5% of total capital investment
$100,000 (total capital) 6% (composite rate of return on total
capital investment)
Secondly, assuming that this corporation has a capital structure of 60% debt
capital and 40% equity capital, all other factors being equal, it is seen that it can
pay a return to its equity holder at 9%, illustrated as follows.
$ 60,000 Debt @ 4% = $2,400 = 2.4% of total capital investment
$ 40,000 Equity @ 9% = $3,600 = 3.6% of total capital investment
$100,000 (total capital) 6.0% (composite rate of return)
Thus it is observed that, by increasing the proportion of debt capital in the
corporation while maintaining a constant rate of interest on debt and a constant
composite rate of return on investment, the return paid to the equity capital
can be appreciably increased. Further, if it be assumed that a rate of return of
6.6% on equity capital is reasonable and just for this corporation having a capital
structure of 60% debt and 40% equity, the composite rate of return can be
reduced to 5.04% as follows.
$ 60,000 Debt @ 4% = $2,400 = 2.4 % of total capital investment
$ 40,000 Equity @ 6.6% = $2,640 = 2.64% of total capital investment
$100,000 (total capital) 5.04% (composite rate of return)
On the basis of these over-simplified calculations, it is clear that the capital
structure of a corporation has a definite bearing on the composite rate of return
which it must receive to service its capital.
One of the major points not discussed above is the fact that, as the ratio of
debt capital increases, the risks to the investors in both debt and equity capital
increase, and it is necessary to pay a higher return to investors to compensate for
these risks. However, the increase in costs thus incurred will be absorbed by the
replacement of equity capital by the considerably cheaper debt capital, with the
over-all effect of reducing the total cost of capital to the corporation. Another
factor not discussed is tax savings that result when equity capital is replaced by
cheaper debt capital. Earnings used to service debt capital are tax exempt,
whereas earnings used to service equity capital are taxed up to 52%. The taxes
on equity earnings are usually counted as an operating expense. It is clear, then,
that if the amount of taxable equity earnings are reduced by replacement of
equity capital with debt capital, the amount of taxes, and, consequently, the
operating expenses are reduced. Of course, in the instant case, since United
already had a high percentage of debt capital in its structure, and the Commission
was content to use the actual capital structure in arriving at a proper composite
rate of return, there was no occasion to compute the tax savings. These savings
need be taken into account only when the Commission or the court computes the
rate of return for a company with a low percentage of debt capital and bases its
computations on a theoretical structure which contains a higher percentage of
debt capital. In the case of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana
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nomical" capital structure (high proportion of debt capital) can
render the same service to the consumer as the utility with an
"expensive" capital structure (low proportion of debt capital)
while charging lower rates if the court allows the capital struc-
ture of the utility to be reflected in the composite rate of return.
It seems that the benefits of an "economical" capital structure
should be passed on to the consumer, and this certainly cannot
be done if the court applies a set figure for a rate of return to
all utilities. 29
Edward C. Abell, Jr.
Public Service Commission, 239 La. 175, 118 So.2d 372 (1960), the Commission
proposed to compute Southern Bell's rate of return on the basis of a capital
structure of 45% debt and 55% equity. The actual structure was approximately
25% debt and 75% equity. The court seemed to accept the Commission's use of
the theoretical structure, but in the end, granted a composite rate of return of
6%, thus failing to take advantage of the savings to consumers that would have
resulted had the Commission's position been adopted. The theory behind the use of
the structure with the higher percentage of debt capital is, of course, to force the
company to adopt the more economical structure by converting some of its equity
capital to debt capital in order to realize the return granted to it on the basis of
the theoretical higher debt ratio. However, since the court refused in the Southern,
Bell case to base the rate of return on the determinations of the Commission, the
company received a rate of return high enough to allow it to maintain its
"expensive" capital structure, which it is under no compulsion to alter at the
present time. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960
Term-Public Law, 21 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 346 (1961).
29. Hawthorne, J., in dissent, argued against the adoption of a standard
figure as a rate of return in the case of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 239 La. 175, 234, 118 So.2d 372, 394(1960), by saying: "I do not think it proper to say that because the Commission
has in the past allowed a return of not less than 6 per cent to other utilities, then
it should not at the present time, or even in the future, allow a return of less
than 6 per cent. Economic conditions change from time to time, and what was a
reasonable and just return in the past may not be just and reasonable now or in
the future."
